Your response

Question (Volume 2)	Your response
Question 6.1:	Is this answer confidential? No
Do you have any comments on Ofcom's assessment of the causes and impacts of online harms? Do you think we have missed anything im- portant in our analysis? Please pro- vide evidence to support your an- swer.	FOUR PAWS UK believe that we are in a strong posi- tion to provide input in the discussions about the Code of Practice offering guidance on how regulated services can comply with their duties to remove ani- mal cruelty content. Of note is that animal cruelty is not explicitly mentioned in the 15 Priority Illegal Harms as laid out by Ofcom despite explicit mention in the Act under:
	Chapter 7 – Interpretation of Part 3
	62 "Priority content that is harmful to children"
	(7) Content which—
	(a) depicts real or realistic serious violence against an animal;
	(b) depicts the real or realistic serious injury of an animal in graphic detail;
	FOUR PAWS UK are concerned that animal cruelty content may be considered as a "secondary" issue, and not treated as a priority if treated separately. This presents a huge risk to the public by exposing them to true and damaging harms of animal cruelty.
Question 6.2:	Is this answer confidential? No
Do you have any views about our in- terpretation of the links between risk factors and different kinds of il- legal harm? Please provide evidence to support your answer.	There is extensive evidence that shows the link be- tween cruelty to animals and violence toward hu- mans, that children who witness animal abuse are at greater risk of becoming abusers themselves to both humans and animals, that "childhood exposure to maltreatment of companion animals is associated with psychopathology in childhood and adulthood" and increasing evidence that young people who view animal abuse on social media are graduating to child sex abuse material (CSAM) online. A 2006 study stated that "witnessing animal abuse normalises the behaviour for the observer, potentially translating to a perception that such acts are socially acceptable".
	Article 9 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the UK signed in 1990 and ratified the following year, requires States Parties to 'take all ap-

Question (Volume 2)	Your response
	propriate legislative, administrative, social and educa- tional measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence'. In August 2023, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child issued a number of comments relating to the implementation of the Convention, including General Comment 26, par- agraph 35 of which states: 'Children must be pro- tected from all forms of physical and psychological vi- olence and from exposure to violence, such as do- mestic violence or violence inflicted on animals.' The incorporation of animal abuse as an offence under the Online Safety Act will go some way to fulfilling the UK's obligations under the Convention.
	Service type risk factors: Any service can be used to distribute animal cruelty content. Services that have the capacity to share im- ages or videos, post text or share hyperlinks pose particular risks. Social media platforms and messaging services are key services used in the dissemination of such con- tent.
	User base risk factors: Child users on a service can be a risk factor, espe- cially on social media platforms, where children may be exposed to freely shared animal cruelty content.
	Functionalities and recommender systems risk factors: Content recommender systems to show similar or re- lated content increases the risk of cruelty content be- ing shared with those interested in animals. The functionality of group messaging is a risk factor for animal cruelty content, as it allows this content to be shared or traded within communities of users. Di- rect messaging and the ability to post content, such as text and images, are also used by perpetrators to share and distribute animal cruelty content. Encrypted messaging enables perpetrators to share such con- tent with less risk of discovery. Messages or posts can include hyperlinks to collections of animal cruelty content saved on file-storage and file-sharing ser- vices. These hyperlinks can be shared with perpetra- tors, sometimes for a fee. Anonymous profiles can al- low perpetrators to avoid being personally identified

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	by a service when sharing or accessing animal cruelty content.
	Business model risk factors: There is evidence that services which focus on and emphasise growth may deprioritise safety measures. If a service has insufficient focus on having effective moderation and verification processes in place, this can be exploited by perpetrators to share animal cru- elty content.
	The Social Media Animal Cruelty Coalition, SMACC, has found that social media platforms often do not re- move content in breach of their own policies. In 2023 only 47% of the content reported to platforms was re- moved, and many of these removals were only achieved as a result of extended effort by SMACC to escalate content within the platform directly.

Question (Volume 3)	Your response
Question 8.1:	Is this answer confidential? No
Do you agree with our proposals in relation to governance and account- ability measures in the illegal con- tent Codes of Practice? Please pro-	FOUR PAWS UK supports the Codes of Practice as a good start and agree with focusing initially on estab- lishing who within services has primary responsibility for illegal content duties.
vide underlying arguments and evi- dence of efficacy or risks to support your view.	As the Codes of Practice become established, it is im- portant that they ratchet up towards maximum ambi- tion. Staff members with clear, established responsi- bility should face sanctions if those duties are not ful- filled. The suggestion that in time senior manager re- muneration should be tied to positive online safety outcomes would be an effective sanction. It is a con- cept we would like to see explored further.
	SMACC have found that social media platforms often fail to remove content which breaches the Animal Welfare Act when reported, despite clear contraven- tion of platform policies. In 2023, only 47% of links re- ported by SMACC over the preceding two years had been removed by the hosting services. Robust and

Question (Volume 3)	Your response
	specific sanctions, including reductions in senior man- ager renumeration, will be needed to address such in- action and establish clear accountability.
Question 8.2:	Is this answer confidential? No
Do you agree with the types of ser- vices that we propose the govern- ance and accountability measures should apply to?	
Question 8.3:	Is this answer confidential? No
Are you aware of any additional evi- dence of the efficacy, costs and risks associated with a potential future measure to requiring services to have measures to mitigate and man- age illegal content risks audited by an independent third-party?	
Question: 8.4:	Is this answer confidential? No
Are you aware of any additional evi- dence of the efficacy, costs and risks associated with a potential future measure to tie remuneration for senior managers to positive online safety outcomes?	
Question 9.1:	Is this answer confidential? No
Do you agree with our proposals? Please provide the underlying argu- ments and evidence that support your views.	

Question (Volume 3)	Your response
Question 9.2: Do you think the four-step risk as- sessment process and the Risk Pro- files are useful models to help ser- vices navigate and comply with their wider obligations under the Act?	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 9.3: Are the Risk Profiles sufficiently clear and do you think the information provided on risk factors will help you understand the risks on your ser- vice? ¹	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 10.1: Do you have any comments on our draft record keeping and review guidance?	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 10.2: Do you agree with our proposal not to exercise our power to exempt specified descriptions of services from the record keeping and review duty for the moment?	Is this answer confidential? No

¹ If you have comments or input related the links between different kinds of illegal harm and risk factors, please refer to Volume 2: Chapter 5 Summary of the causes and impacts of online harm).

Question (Volume 4)	Your response
Question 11.1: Do you have any comments on our overarching approach to developing our illegal content Codes of Practice?	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 11.2: Do you agree that in general we should apply the most onerous measures in our Codes only to ser- vices which are large and/or medium or high risk?	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 11.3: Do you agree with our definition of large services?	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 11.4: Do you agree with our definition of multi-risk services?	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 11.6: Do you have any comments on the draft Codes of Practice themselves? ²	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 11.7: Do you have any comments on the costs assumptions set out in Annex 14, which we used for calculating the costs of various measures?	Is this answer confidential? No

² See Annexes 7 and 8.

Question (Volume 4)	Your response
Question 12.1:	Is this answer confidential? No
Do you agree with our proposals?	
Please provide the underlying argu- ments and evidence that support	
your views.	
Question 13.1:	Is this answer confidential? No
Do you agree with our proposals? Please provide the underlying argu-	
ments and evidence that support your views.	
Question 14.1:	Is this answer confidential? No
Do you agree with our proposals? Do you have any views on our three	
proposals, i.e. CSAM hash matching, CSAM URL detection and fraud key-	
word detection? Please provide the	
underlying arguments and evidence that support your views.	
Question 14.2:	Is this answer confidential? No
Do you have any comments on the	
draft guidance set out in Annex 9 re- garding whether content is commu-	
nicated 'publicly' or 'privately'?	

Question 14.3:Is this answer confidential? NoDo you have any relevant evidence on:• The accuracy of perceptual hash matching and the costs of applying CSAM hash matching to smaller services;• The ability of services in scope of the CSAM hash matching measure to access hash database/services, with respect to access crite- ria or requirements set by database and/or hash matching service providers;• The costs of applying our CSAM URL detection meas- ure to smaller services; and the effectiveness of fuzzy matching³ for CSAM URL detec- tion) measure, including for smaller services; and• An effective application of hash matching and/or URL detection for terrorism con- tent, including how such measures could address con- cerns around 'context' and	Question (Volume 4)	Your response
 on: The accuracy of perceptual hash matching and the costs of applying CSAM hash matching to smaller services; The ability of services in scope of the CSAM hash matching measure to access hash databases/services, with respect to access criteria or requirements set by database and/or hash matching service providers; The costs of applying our CSAM URL detection measure to smaller services, and the effectiveness of fuzzy matching³ for CSAM URL detection; The costs of applying our articles for use in frauds (standard keyword detection) measure, including for smaller service; and An effective application of hash matching and/or URL detection for terrorism content, including how such measures could address concerns around 'context' and 	Question 14.3:	Is this answer confidential? No
freedom of expression, and any information you have on the costs and efficacy of ap- plying hash matching and URL detection for terrorism content to a range of ser-	 Question 14.3: Do you have any relevant evidence on: The accuracy of perceptual hash matching and the costs of applying CSAM hash matching to smaller services; The ability of services in scope of the CSAM hash matching measure to access hash databases/services, with respect to access crite- ria or requirements set by database and/or hash matching service providers; The costs of applying our CSAM URL detection meas- ure to smaller services, and the effectiveness of fuzzy matching³ for CSAM URL de- tection; The costs of applying our ar- ticles for use in frauds (standard keyword detec- tion) measure, including for smaller services; and An effective application of hash matching and/or URL detection for terrorism con- tent, including how such measures could address con- cerns around 'context' and freedom of expression, and any information you have on the costs and efficacy of ap- plying hash matching and URL detection for terrorism 	

³ Fuzzy matching can allow a match between U2U content and a URL list, despite the text not being exactly the same.

Question (Volume 4)	Your response
Question 15.1: Do you agree with our proposals? Please provide the underlying argu- ments and evidence that support your views.	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 16.1: Do you agree with our proposals? Please provide the underlying argu- ments and evidence that support your views.	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 17.1: Do you agree with our proposals? Please provide the underlying argu- ments and evidence that support your views.	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 17.2: Do you have any evidence, in partic- ular on the use of prompts, to guide further work in this area?	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 18.1: Do you agree with our proposals? Please provide the underlying argu- ments and evidence that support your views.	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 18.2: Are there functionalities outside of the ones listed in our proposals, that should explicitly inform users around changing default settings?	Is this answer confidential? No

Question (Volume 4)	Your response
Question 18.3:	Is this answer confidential? No
Are there other points within the user journey where under 18s	
should be informed of the risk of ille-	
gal content?	
Question 19.1:	Is this answer confidential? No
Do you agree with our proposals?	
Please provide the underlying argu- ments and evidence that support	
your views.	
Question 19.2:	Is this answer confidential? No
What evaluation methods might be	
suitable for smaller services that do not have the capacity to perform on-	
platform testing?	
Question 19.3:	Is this answer confidential? No
We are aware of design features and	
parameters that can be used in rec- ommender system to minimise the	
distribution of illegal content, e.g.	
ensuring content/network balance and low/neutral weightings on con-	
tent labelled as sensitive. Are you	
aware of any other design parame-	
ters and choices that are proven to improve user safety?	

Question (Volume 4)	Your response
Question 20.1: Do you agree with our proposals? Please provide the underlying argu- ments and evidence that support your views.	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 20.2: Do you think the first two proposed measures should include require- ments for how these controls are made known to users?	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 20.3: Do you think there are situations where the labelling of accounts through voluntary verification schemes has particular value or risks?	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 21.1: Do you agree with our proposals? Please provide the underlying argu- ments and evidence that support your views.	Is this answer confidential? No
 Question 21.2: Do you have any supporting information and evidence to inform any recommendations we may make on blocking sharers of CSAM content? Specifically: What are the options available to block and prevent a user from returning to a service (e.g. blocking by 	Is this answer confidential? No

Question (Volume 4)	Your response
 username, email or IP ad- dress, or a combination of factors)? What are the ad- vantages and disadvantages of the different options, in- cluding any potential impact on other users? How long should a user be blocked for sharing known CSAM, and should the pe- riod vary depending on the nature of the offence com- mitted? There is a risk that lawful content is erroneously classi- fied as CSAM by automated systems, which may impact on the rights of law-abiding users. What steps can ser- vices take to manage this risk? For example, are there alternative options to imme- diate blocking (such as a strikes system) that might help mitigate some of the risks and impacts on user rights? 	
Question 22.1: Do you agree with our proposals? Please provide the underlying argu- ments and evidence that support your views.	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 23.1: Do you agree that the overall burden of our measures on low risk small and micro businesses is proportion- ate?	Is this answer confidential? No

Question (Volume 4)	Your response
Question 23.2: Do you agree that the overall burden is proportionate for those small and micro businesses that find they have significant risks of illegal content and for whom we propose to recom- mend more measures?	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 23.3: We are applying more measures to large services. Do you agree that the overall burden on large services pro- portionate?	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 24.1: Do you agree that Ofcom's proposed recommendations for the Codes are appropriate in the light of the mat- ters to which Ofcom must have re- gard? If not, why not?	Is this answer confidential? No FOUR PAWS UK investigative research has found that many social media platforms regularly fail to im- plement their own policies or enforce their community guidelines consistently. It is very challenging to report cases of abuse on these platforms as often the mechanisms for reporting are limited to specific issues only, e.g. pornography, and therefore people are unable to truly report and only have the option to "hide" a post. We believe that training is essential to ensure that moderators can distinguish harmful content and effec- tively remove it from the public domain to protect its users. We also recommend that specific reporting mechanisms are enables for such illegal activity and that their own internal policies and enforcement pro- cedures are reviewed regularly to ensure they are fit for purpose. These services should seek consultation from experts on illegal harms to assist with risk as- sessments and mitigation actions around policy, mod- eration and other relevant approaches to dealing with harmful content.

Question (Volume 5)	Your response
Question 26.1:	Is this answer confidential? No
Do you agree with our proposals, including the detail of the draft- ing? What are the underlying ar- guments and evidence that in- form your view.	FOUR PAWS UK are broadly in agreement with the pro- posals, however it is unclear how Ofcom will ensure that services consider a range of sources of evidence, to en- sure a balanced assessment of risk in the development of their mitigation processes.
	FOUR PAWS UK believes that it is essential that these regulations do not target or eliminate education content that seeks to raise awareness of animal welfare issues, and therefore for legitimate means. Examples include public awareness raising, campaigning or fundraising for animal protection, conservation and other related organi- sations.
Question 26.2: Do you consider the guidance to be sufficiently accessible, particu- larly for services with limited ac- cess to legal expertise?	Is this answer confidential? No
Question 26.3:	Is this answer confidential? No
What do you think of our assess- ment of what information is rea- sonably available and relevant to illegal content judgements?	For any assessment of animal cruelty content, NGOs and high-level experts in animal protection must be con- sulted, particularly in regard to implications of the Animal Welfare Act (2006).

Question (Volume 6)	Your response
Question 28.1: Do you have any comments on	Is this answer confidential? No
our proposed approach to infor- mation gathering powers under the Act?	

Question (Volume 6)	Your response
Question 29.1: Do you have any comments on our draft Online Safety Enforce- ment Guidance?	Is this answer confidential? No

Question (Annex 13)	Your response
Question A13.1:	Is this answer confidential? No
Do you agree that our proposals as set out in Chapter 16 (report- ing and complaints), and Chapter 10 and Annex 6 (record keeping) are likely to have positive, or more positive impacts on oppor- tunities to use Welsh and treating Welsh no less favourably than English?	
Question A13.2: If you disagree, please explain why, including how you consider these proposals could be revised to have positive effects or more positive effects, or no adverse ef- fects or fewer adverse effects on opportunities to use Welsh and treating Welsh no less favourably than English.	Is this answer confidential? No

Please complete this form in full and return to <u>IHconsultation@ofcom.org.uk</u>.