# Your response

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| **Chapter 3.1**<br><br>**Consultation question 1:** Do you agree with our proposed approach to determining QWR? We would welcome comments in particular on:<br><br>a) Our proposal to define QWR by reference to worldwide revenues.<br><br>b) Our proposals in relation to apportioning revenue to the regulated service.<br><br>c) Our proposed approach to requiring QWR to be aggregated across all regulated services provided by the provider.<br><br>d) Our proposal to take account of revenues received by another group undertaking in the determination of QWR.<br><br>**Consultation question 2:** Do you agree with our proposed definition of 'qualifying period'?<br><br>**Consultation question 3:** Do you have any views on our proposal not to issue a statement to Part 4B services (VSPs) (under paragraph 21 of Schedule 17 to the Act)?<br><br>Please provide evidence to support your responses. | Confidential? – No<br><br>Ukie is the trade body for the UK's video games and interactive entertainment industry. A not-for-profit, it represents more than 700 games businesses of all sizes from start-ups to multinational developers, publishers, and service companies, working across online, mobile, console, PC, esports, virtual reality and augmented reality. Ukie aims to support, grow, and promote member businesses and the wider UK video games and interactive entertainment industry by optimising the economic, cultural, political, and social environment needed for businesses in our sector to thrive.<br><br>Our response underscores that the video games industry prioritises the safety of its player community above all else. The industry is deeply committed to providing a safe, fun, fair, and inclusive playing experience for its large and growing audience. This commitment includes equipping parents, carers, and players with the tools and information they need to customise their experiences and set their own boundaries.<br><br>However, we are concerned that Ofcom's proposed approach could impose unpredictable, arbitrary, and disproportionate costs on video games companies. Determining the share of revenue attributable to a game's online functionality would be inherently subjective, requiring extensive and detailed documentation. Given the diverse nature of video games, it would be nearly impossible to establish standard practices or calculations. As a result, companies would struggle to predict their fees for any given year, and Ofcom would face similar challenges in forecasting its funding stream.<br><br>Most games companies required to undertake this calculation will be providing services with minimal or ancillary online user-to-user interaction. These services represent some of the lowest-risk offerings regulated under the Online Safety Act (OSA). Yet, asking these companies to contribute the same share of global revenue as the largest and riskiest social media platforms risks creating an unfair |

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| | burden. Video games companies, which have already invested heavily in safety and trust technologies, would effectively subsidise the regulation of higher-risk services, such as social media platforms, that contribute more directly to online harm for UK users.<br><br>The current proposal overlooks the unique nature of video games, where online functionality often serves as an ancillary and minimal part of the overall experience. Under this framework, these ancillary features could place an undue and disproportionate burden on the service as a whole. Furthermore, this structure could lead to substandard services in the UK, negatively affecting players by forcing the developers to restrict ancillary online features to avoid being required to pay unduly and unproportionate fees. It also risks undermining digital literacy efforts in the UK.<br><br>Additionally, Ofcom's reliance on a sample size of just 30 RFIs (as detailed in Annex 6 of the consultation) is inadequate, particularly given that:<br><br>1. Ofcom has had over a year to issue and review information from providers.<br><br>2. Ofcom estimates that thousands of providers will fall within the scope of the OSA.<br><br>This limited sampling raises significant doubts about Ofcom's impact assessment, including the claim that the largest five providers account for 90% of the total QWR and that "fee amounts paid by larger providers are still manageable and small relative to their QWR" (paragraph 5.25).<br><br>It is unclear how Ofcom selected the providers to contact, determined that 30 was an adequate number, or ensured that this sample was representative of the vast range of regulated services. For instance, Ofcom acknowledges in paragraph 5.21 that it lacks detailed evidence about large providers with small UK user bases. There is also no clarity on whether Ofcom included large providers with a limited number of regulated services or those where regulated services are ancillary to their primary business model.<br><br>This lack of clarity extends to interactive entertainment and games companies, whose worldwide revenues surpass those of many platforms where regulated services are core to their business models. For many video games |

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| | companies, regulated services are ancillary, with user-to-user features rarely monetised directly. As a result, games companies are likely to:<br><br>1. Pay disproportionately high fees, funding a larger share of Ofcom's activities compared to companies driving higher regulatory costs.<br>2. Receive limited and unclear guidance on revenue apportionment.<br><br>To ensure fairness, we support Ofcom to base their fee structure on UK user base size as a more practical and equitable way to determine fees. We urge Ofcom to reconsider its reluctance toward this approach, stressing the importance of clear communication and fair treatment of the UK industry.<br><br>Lastly, we believe Ofcom's guidance for calculating QWR using a "just and reasonable" apportionment is vague and risks inconsistent application across providers. This is especially problematic for companies offering regulated services as minor features within broader, unregulated services that are monetised differently from traditional social media platforms.<br><br>Ukie strongly urges Ofcom to provide a simpler and predictable fee structure, accompanied by detailed, industry-specific guidance on calculating QWR. This new structure and guidance should address challenges faced by companies with multiple services and clarify how revenues should be apportioned when regulated features are ancillary to a broader service. Clear guidance will reduce disputes and enable companies to calculate their fees accurately, fairly, and consistently.<br><br>In addition, our members recommend that Ofcom take a close look at the fee structure imposed by the Digital Services Act (DSA) to ensure regulatory alignment between jurisdictions and avoid burdening international companies with various fee structures.<br><br>**Consultation Question 1: Do you agree with our proposed approach to determining QWR? We would welcome comments in particular on:**<br><br>a) **Our proposal to define QWR by reference to worldwide revenues.** |

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| | Ukie's members appreciate the challenges of overseeing a regime as wide-ranging as the Online Safety Act (OSA), and acknowledge the need for the regulatory costs to be shared fairly among those companies subject to the regime. However, we have significant concerns about Ofcom's proposal to define Qualifying Worldwide Revenue (QWR), as the proposed approach fails to account for the different impacts that services have in the UK market versus globally and disproportionately penalises companies with diverse international portfolios.<br><br>The vast majority of video game companies in the UK are not categorised services under the OSA, and their business models differ greatly from higher-risk services such as social media platforms. For instance:<br><br>• a video games company might have significant global revenue, but the UK market could only represent a small fraction of this revenue. By using global revenue as the basis for calculating QWR, companies with a diverse international portfolio could end up paying disproportionate fees, despite having limited or no significant impact on UK users. For this purpose, whilst a proposal for an exemption for services with a smaller UK revenue is welcomed, the proposed threshold of £10m in revenue is too low. We'd welcome additional information from Ofcom to share the rationale and evidence for this figure. For the video game sector, whilst in scope for the OSA, the industry is collectively facing higher development fees in an increasingly competitive market. Accordingly, levying additional fees for services that operate in the UK (when Ofcom acknowledges in their consultation is often a small market to global companies) may lead to reduced services being offered in the UK to avoid this regime. This burden will especially be felt by medium and smaller video game developers (which are often drivers of innovation in the industry and many of which are based in the UK) who are less able to insulate against rising costs with resources.<br>• Additionally, Ofcom's assertion that "*providers may not account separately for revenues attributable to use of the service by users in the UK and users in the rest of the world*" demonstrates the |

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| | flaws in the sample of information collected by Ofcom. It is much easier for the interactive entertainment and games companies to isolate revenues by use of our services by UK users, as revenue for most games related services is derived from purchases of digital content/services (such as game downloads) from online storefronts rather than monetised social features that is a more common practice for social networks, than it is to provide that information on a worldwide basis. The worldwide approach increases the compliance burden on interactive entertainment and games companies, considering: (i) the complexity of global corporate structures, where different entities may be the providers of regulated service globally; and (ii) that regulated services operated by these companies (for example, voice/text chat within an online game) are not typically monetised directly, so complex apportionment exercises will need to be carried out in respect of every regulated service on a worldwide basis.<br>• Ofcom has provided a clear indication (in paragraph 5.21) in the Consultation that Ofcom expects companies seeking to rely on the £10m exemption to calculate its UK revenues and respond to RFIs on the same. The strong implication here is that companies will be expected to devise a way of calculating their UK revenues in a way that is compliant with general accounting principles and reconciles with the information reported in their global accounts if they want to rely on the exemption and / or when requested to do so by Ofcom. It is therefore unclear why, with advance notice of the same, the compliance burden of calculating UK revenues is positioned by Ofcom as the primary reason for tying QWR to worldwide revenues.<br><br>Additionally, the current proposal could result in smaller sectors, like the video games sector, subsidising the costs of regulating larger, higher-risk services and sectors like social media and pornography given the sheer number of services that they provide.<br><br>Ukie's members strongly believe that the definition of QWR should be more reflective of the actual revenues |

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| | generated from the UK, rather than worldwide revenues. A UK-linked revenue approach would ensure that the fees companies pay are proportional to their actual presence and impact in the UK market. This would also align better with the regulatory goals of the OSA, which are intended to protect UK consumers, rather than imposing excessive burdens on companies based on their global scale.<br><br>As we have highlighted in previous consultation responses, it is important to recognize that online multiplayer games differ significantly from social media and other online platforms. The content of these games is designed to adhere to age-appropriate standards, and where user interactions are possible, they are typically limited, often brief, and subject to parental controls or restrictions based on the age-appropriateness of the game.<br><br>In general, our members support the principle that regulatory burdens should be proportionate to the size of the service, the resources available to it, and the risks it poses. Proportionality in scale and type of risk must be a key factor when considering appropriate measures for online services. The games industry is diverse, with businesses of all sizes creating and publishing content across multiple platforms. This diversity is reflected in the UK's Games Map, where we have mapped over 2,600 games companies located in clusters across the country. The UK is home to global publishers, platforms, and many development studios, including large, medium, and numerous small, independent businesses.<br><br>b) **Our proposals in relation to apportioning revenue to the regulated service.**<br><br>The apportionment of revenue to a regulated service is a complex issue, especially for companies in the video game industry, which often provide multiple regulated services that are often not directly monetised (unlike traditional social media services) across various platforms. Ukie's members understand the need for fairness and transparency in how revenues are attributed to regulated services, but we are concerned that the approach proposed by Ofcom does not adequately reflect the diverse nature of the video games industry. Many video game companies publish multiple games, with different levels of popularity in the UK market and typically do not monetise the social features within their games that are in-scope for the OSA. |

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| | The apportionment of revenue to a regulated service is a complex issue, particularly for companies in the video games industry, which often provide multiple services across various platforms, including both user-to-user services regulated by the OSA and other services that are not. Unlike traditional social media platforms, these services are often not directly monetised, adding further complexity to revenue attribution. Ukie's members understand the need for fairness and transparency in attributing revenues to regulated services but are concerned that the approach proposed by Ofcom is inherently vague and does not adequately reflect the diverse nature of the video games industry. Therefore, Ukie would welcome further, industry-specific examples from Ofcom to clarify what a "fair and reasonable" apportionment might look like. For instance, how should revenues be apportioned for a game that is monetised through purchases of in-game virtual currency if that in-game virtual currency can be used throughout the game (i.e. not just in the "user-to-user" modes of the game)? How should revenues generated from in-game advertising be apportioned?<br><br>For example, in many cases across the video game industry, there will be ancillary features that are in-scope for the OSA, e.g. voice and text chat, but these features are not directly monetised. This is because games, typically, do not run ads or charge users to access these social features. Instead, revenue is typically tied to the game's purchase price or microtransactions within the game, such as the purchase of in-game content such as new levels, boosts or cosmetic items for in-game characters.<br><br>Additionally, not only will the scope of social features within online games will vary considerably, but the importance of the feature will vary. For example, many games charge players a one-off price at the time of purchase and include a significant offline only mode (with no player-to-player interaction) but a small and limited online mode with a small text chat function. In this case, apportioning revenue to the regulated service using a "just and reasonable" basis provides no guidance to video game providers. Instead, the proposed methodology is unclear, vague, unworkable in practice and inconsistent with Ofcom's duty in s 3(4A) of the CA03 to have regard for the need to be clear to providers of regulated services on how they may comply with their duties under the OSA. |

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| | It is unclear what constitutes a "*just and reasonable*" method for apportionment of referral revenue, and it is inappropriate that this determination is entrusted to providers, to perform on case-by-case basis. This may well result in significant inconsistencies in approaches taken by providers operating in the same industry and ultimately in some providers paying significantly more fees than others while operating the same types of regulated services with the same risk profiles.<br><br>c) **Our proposed approach to requiring QWR to be aggregated across all regulated services provided by the provider.**<br>Ukie strongly disagrees with the proposal to aggregate QWR, as currently defined, across all regulated services provided by a company. As explained above, this proposal would unfairly penalise companies with a larger portfolio of services, even if those services are not particularly relevant to the UK market. Many video game companies, for example, have a wide range of games that are not particularly popular in the UK, yet these companies could still face higher fees simply due to the popularity of such services abroad and the number of regulated services they provide.<br><br>For example, consider a Japanese video game publisher with a QWR exceeding the threshold, whose primary audience is in Japan. This company might have one game with a minor text chat feature and a small number of UK users, yet it would be required to pay fees due to its aggregated QWR. In contrast, a UK-based social media service, operating solely in the UK, generating £100m in revenue (below the QWR threshold), and offering a service with possibly greater risk and impact on the UK market, would not be subject to fees. This discrepancy highlights how the proposal disproportionately affects companies with global portfolios, even when their services have minimal relevance to the UK market, and undermines the objectives of the OSA to protect UK consumers from harmful online content.<br><br>This approach is neither proportionate nor aligned with the principle of fairness, as it imposes higher fees on companies that may only generate modest revenues from the |

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| | UK, but significant revenues globally. In fact, it may discourage companies from launching new regulated services in the UK, as to do so would then bring the entirety of that service's global revenues into scope, even if only a fraction of those services fall within the scope of the OSA.<br><br>While we understand that aggregating revenues across regulated services makes sense from an efficacy perspective, it is only fair to do so if the definition of QWR is itself defined fairly. A more reasonable approach would be to calculate fees on a per-service basis, so that only those regulated services with significant UK referable revenues and QWR are subject to fees, but allow companies to file a single group-wide report to cover all of their regulated services subject to a fee obligation. This would ensure that the financial burden of regulation is more directly tied to the services that are actually used by UK users or that impact UK users, rather than linking fees to the global scale of a company's global operations.<br><br>d) **Our proposal to take account of revenues received by another group undertaking in the determination of QWR.**<br>Yes, but subject to our response to Question 1(c) above and only on the basis that such revenues received by another group undertaking are generated from a UK regulated service, and not from the availability of the service elsewhere in the world.<br><br>**Consultation Question 2: Do you agree with our proposed definition of 'qualifying period'?**<br><br>Ukie's members agrees that defining the qualifying period as the second calendar year preceding the charging year provides some consistency in terms of financial data. However, we have concerns about how this definition may fail to account for the dynamic nature of the video game industry, where revenues can fluctuate significantly due to new game releases, seasonal content, and significant game updates. The proposed definition could miss |

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| | important changes in a company's revenue that may occur in the year immediately preceding the charging year, particularly for video game companies that frequently update and release new content to their user base. For example, if an online game with minor and optional social features releases additional single-player content that is played within an online environment but without direct user-to-user interaction (e.g. players can see the impact of other players in the game environment, see player leaderboards or can pass other players by in-game but cannot interact) or new popular in-game cosmetic items (such as a new outfit for an in-game character that is tied to a recent popular movie release) this will lead to a spike in revenue. However, using the "just and reasonable" approach to apportionment, it will be very difficult to determine how this revenue should be "apportioned" to social features within a game.<br><br>**Consultation Question 3: Do you have any views on our proposal not to issue a statement to Part 4B services (VSPs) (under paragraph 21 of Schedule 17 to the Act)?**<br><br>N/A |
| **Chapter 3.2**<br><br>**Consultation question 4:** Do you agree with our proposal for determining the QWR of a group, when calculating the maximum penalty that may be imposed on a provider and one or more group undertakings which are jointly and severally liable for a breach under the Act, i.e. that it is determined as the sum of the worldwide revenues of the provider and each of its group undertakings, whether or not attributable to the provision of a regulated service? Please provide evidence in support of your response. | Confidential? – N<br><br>While we understand the policy goal behind linking penalties to the QWR of a group when calculating the maximum penalty that may be imposed under the OSA, we do not believe it is appropriate to include in that QWR calculation the revenues of group undertakings that are not attributable to the provision of a regulated service. For instance, a group company may have multiple businesses, some of which have nothing to do with the provision of regulated services, including global revenues from such services in the calculation of QWR would be wholly disproportionate as such services are not within the scope of the OSA or Ofcom's oversight. Such unrelated revenues should not be considered when calculating the QWR of a group for the purposes of determining a maximum penalty under the OSA. |

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| **Chapter 3.3**<br><br>**Consultation question 5:** Do you have any comments on our proposed advice to the Secretary of State to set a QWR threshold figure within the range of £200m to £500m, with a preferred figure of £250m, for all types of regulated services?<br><br>**Consultation question 6:** Do you have any comments on our proposed exemption for providers with UK revenue less than £10m in a qualifying period?<br><br>**Consultation question 7:** Do you agree that an exemption for services contributing to the public interest is not required at this time given the proposed QWR threshold and UK revenue exemption?<br><br>Please provide evidence to support your responses. | Confidential? – Y / N<br><br>**Consultation Question 5: Do you have any comments on our proposed advice to the Secretary of State to set a QWR threshold figure within the range of £200m to £500m, with a preferred figure of £250m, for all types of regulated services?**<br><br>Ukie's members have concerns about the proposed QWR threshold range of £200m to £500m, particularly the preferred figure of £250m. While we understand that Ofcom aims to target only larger and more impactful companies with these fees, we believe this threshold could impose disproportionate financial burdens on certain sectors, such as the video game industry, if the definition of QWR remains as currently proposed or QWR are aggregated across all regulated services provided by a company's group.<br><br>The video games sector is made up of both large multinational companies and smaller firms, many of which have international operations. While their global revenues may be substantial, their UK market presence is often much smaller. The proposed £250m threshold could result in companies with limited UK-referable revenue being subjected to fees, which we feel does not align with the OSA's intent to regulate based on actual risks to UK consumers. For example, a games service that includes minor social features that has a limited UK user base but a large international base, may generate a little over £10m revenue in the UK, but generate over £250m globally would be in scope for fees. However, an online social network that only operates in the UK and solely relies on social features aimed at UK children, but generated £180m in the UK only, would conversely not be in scope for fees, despite clearly offering a far higher risk profile to UK users. Accordingly, by focusing solely on revenue, and drawing from global revenue figures, the proposed regime risks lower risk services subsidising the fees for higher risk UK services under the current thresholds.<br><br>We believe that the threshold should be higher to ensure that the financial burden of regulation is more appropriately distributed among services with a significant impact in the UK. Ukie suggests that in order to better reflect the size and scope of services that are more likely to present a meaningful risk to UK users, either: (i) the proposed |

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| | £250m threshold remain but (a) the definition of QWR be amended in accordance with our response to Question 1(a) above; (b) QWR not be aggregated across all regulated services; and (c) UK referable revenues not be aggregated across all regulated services; or (ii) the upper range of £500m be used instead. Setting the threshold closer to £500m would ease the regulatory burden on smaller firms and encourage further investment in the UK video games market. The proposed £250m threshold may be too low, especially for video game companies, many of which would exceed this figure due to their global operations, even if their UK impact remains limited.<br><br>**Consultation Question 6: Do you have any comments on our proposed exemption for providers with UK revenue less than £10m in a qualifying period?**<br><br>Ukie's members support the concept of an exemption for providers with UK-referable revenue less than £10m in a qualifying period but have significant concerns that the current proposal to aggregate this threshold across all regulated services provided by a company's group will render this exemption meaningless to the video games industry. The intention behind this exemption should be to ensure that smaller services are not unduly burdened by regulatory costs that do not align with their level of market impact. The exemption, if not aggregated across all regulated services, would provide much-needed relief to smaller game developers and other providers whose UK operations are minimal. If, however, the exemption was to be aggregated across all regulated services provided by a company's group, it would quickly become of no practical benefit to companies that offer multiple regulated services in the UK.<br><br>However, our members believe that the proposed threshold of £10m should be carefully considered in the context of the video games industry. The sole focus on revenue is problematic, as it associates online harms with revenue, which often do not go hand in hand. Whilst a small revenue cap is certainly helpful for smaller providers, the £10m threshold is simply too low. From Ofcom's consultation, the £10m figure doesn't appear to be backed by evidence, so some additional justification for this low figure would be helpful. |

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| | In addition, while Ofcom on the one hand recognises the need to employ the principle of proportionality in respect of providers where the majority of revenue is derived from activities not connected to the provision of regulated service(s) (paragraph 3.1.7 and footnote 30), no exemption is proposed for services these services (i.e. services that include regulated social features as a minor feature within a wider unregulated service) in the Consultation.<br><br>In circumstances where Ofcom does not consider it workable or appropriate to take into account the number, risk profile or categorisation of services and is therefore relying entirely on providers' revenue, it is not justifiable or proportionate to equate providers whose operation of regulated services has little to no impact on revenue generation to those where it is key aspect of their profit model. An additional exemption from the fees regime should therefore be introduced for providers who do not generate any revenue from their regulated services or where the amount of revenue generated falls below a certain threshold (with the threshold set on the basis of an evidence led approach to setting the relevant threshold).<br><br>**Consultation Question 7: Do you agree that an exemption for services contributing to the public interest is not required at this time given the proposed QWR threshold and UK revenue exemption?**<br><br>N/A |
| **Chapter 3.4**<br><br>**Consultation question 8:** Do you agree with our proposed approach to setting the amount of fees payable by providers above the QWR threshold? Please provide evidence to support your response. | Confidential? – Y / N<br><br>Ukie's members are concerned that the proposed fee rate (approximately 0.02%) could disproportionately impact companies in the video games sector, particularly when their global revenue is taken into account.<br><br>The video games industry is unique in that it involves a large number of services, many of which may have minimal UK exposure but substantial global revenues. Additionally, many of these services contain minor features that are regulated services (e.g. voice and text chat) that |

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| | are not monetised and are bundled together with wider unregulated services that are monetised.<br><br>It is also important to emphasise that the fees structure should focus on the ***actual risks*** presented by the service, considering the mitigation measures already in place rather than solely focusing on revenue. Ukie members propose that other factors beyond revenue should be taken into account when determining fees, such as the service's risk profile.<br><br>Ofcom is within its powers to adopt this approach, as S 84(2(a)(ii) of the OSA sets out that Ofcom may use other factors, in addition to revenue, when setting fees. The SoS' Guidance about fees, published on 24 May 2024, states that Ofcom may consult based on additional factors such as: (i) the number of services in scope; (ii) the revenue spread and variety of functions across regulated providers; (iii) market presence; and (iv) any other factors relating to providers (as long as these are justifiable and proportionate).<br><br>In addition, Ofcom sets out the potential approaches for taking account of factors other than QWR. However, it does not directly address the resources which will be expended to supervision of regulated services. Further, no empirical evidence, in respect of how Ofcom's resources have been apportioned to date, or in relation to its budgets for the coming year, is provided or drawn upon to substantiate this approach. Adopting a less straightforward method to implementation of the fees regime, or one that may require more careful thought from Ofcom than the single percentage method is not in and of itself a reason to avoid doing this.<br><br>Our members are also confused by the fact that Ofcom has been developing a sophisticated Categorisation system for the past years, only to ignore it when it comes to the fee structure. As it was made clear by Ofcom in the past, the Categorised services, especially Category 1, will have to comply with more Ofcom requirements than other regulated services. We, therefore, believe that this should mean that this emphasis of Ofcom should also be reflected in the fees these services should pay.<br><br>It is also unclear how often categorisation of services would change, in practice, such that it would purportedly impede on the principle of stability when the alternative, |

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| | being proposed by Ofcom, is that providers with low-risk profiles (which includes many in the games industry), a limited number of regulated services and / or ones that are not subject to additional duties under the OSA pay the same percentage of fees as other providers. It is clear that these services will use less of Ofcom's resources and yet will be required to front a disproportionately large percentage of Ofcom's fees based on the current proposals. In these circumstances, it is unclear why Ofcom is not proposing to take factors other than revenue into account for the fees regime.<br><br>This approach would better align the regulatory costs with the actual risks posed by each service (as recognised by the OSA and Ofcom), and ensure that the video games industry is not unfairly burdened by fees that do not reflect the actual scale of their operations in the UK, as well as ignore all the work that has already gone into safeguarding players on their services. Although Ofcom's work may evolve over time to focus on lower risk services, we do not believe that oversight of lower risk regulated services will be as involved or indeed as frequent as that of the riskier and larger categorised services in respect of which the OSA was introduced.<br><br>In summary, while our members understand the need for a fair and consistent approach to setting fees, we believe that the proposed flat fee structure based solely on global QWR could result in disproportionate fees for the video game sector. We encourage Ofcom to consider a more nuanced, tiered fee structure that takes into account the actual risk of a service, as well as and the ongoing mitigation work happening in this sector that adopts a safety-by-design approach.<br><br>Additionally, Ukie's members suggest that a rolling average for revenue thresholds, disaggregation of QWR and UK referable revenues, and further clarification QWR apportionment would provide much-needed flexibility and fairness for smaller developers and companies with fluctuating revenues or large portfolios. |

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| **Chapter 4**<br><br>**Consultation question 9:** Do you agree with our proposals relating to supporting evidence, documentation and other information, and manner of notification, as reflected in our Notification Regulations (Annex 10)?<br><br>**Consultation question 10:** Do you have any comments on the proposed Manner of Notification document in Annex 11 accompanying the Notification Regulations? | Confidential? – N<br><br>NA |
| **Chapter 5**<br><br>**Consultation question 11:** Do you agree with our assessment of the potential impact of our proposals? If you disagree, please explain why. | Confidential? – N<br><br>NA |
| **Overall**<br><br>**Consultation question 12:** Do you have further views / comments that you wish to make in respect of this consultation?<br><br>Please provide evidence in support of your responses. | Confidential? – N<br><br>NA |
| **Annex A7 questions** | |
| **Consultation question A1:** In relation to our equality impact assessment, do you agree with our assessment of the potential impact of our proposals on equality groups? If you disagree, please explain why. | Confidential? – N<br><br>NA |

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| **Consultation question A2:** Are you currently aware of any providers of regulated services targeting or providing support in any way to specific equality groups that are likely to generate a QWR that meets or exceeds the proposed threshold?<br><br>**Consultation question A3:** In relation to our Welsh language assessment, do you agree that our proposals are likely to have positive, or more positive impacts on opportunities to use Welsh and treating Welsh no less favourably than English? If you disagree, please explain why, including how you consider these proposals could be revised to have positive effects or more positive effects, or no adverse effects or fewer adverse effects on opportunities to use Welsh and treating Welsh no less favourably than English. | |

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